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ARGUMENT 
I. THE ISSUE OF CREDITING EBY WITH GEARY'S EXCESSIVE 
SETTLEMENT TO LANGE IS PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT. 
Plaintiff/Appellee, Venna M. Swalberg Lange ("Lange"), agrees that 
Defendant/Appellant David Eby ("Eby") has the right to raise on appeal the basis for the 
trial court's denial of Eby's Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from Judgment.1 However, 
rather than addressing the true basis for the denial, Lange erroneously tries to create a 
basis that she can attack. Lange nowhere addresses the fact that Eby raised as a reason 
for his rule 60(b) motion the failure of the trial court to credit him with the excessive 
portions of co-defendant Geary Construction Inc.'s ("Geary") settlement with Lange, 
after being told by the trial court that it would receive briefing, fully consider and then 
rule on that specific issue before entering a judgment on a verdict against Eby. Instead, 
Lange tries to suggest that Eby's basis for his rule 60(b) motion was limited to 
"irregularities in entering the judgment prior to expiration to the time for making 
objections." (Lange Br. at 6-7.) Although it is true that such irregularities were part of the 
basis for Eby's rule 60(b) motion, it was not limited to those "irregularities." 
Eby's rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment was based in part on the issue of 
the credit to which Eby is entitled by law. The issue of the credit had not been decided at 
the time Eby brought his motion. The trial court, before trial, ruled that it would receive 
!Lange further agrees that if the basis is the trial court's ruling that Eby was not 
entitled to have the judgment against him credited with co-defendant Geary Construction 
Inc.'s settlement proceeds, the standard of review on this issue is correctness under the 
law, not abuse of discretion. (Lange Br. at 2.) 
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briefing and rule on that issue after trial should doing so be necessary following a verdict 
against Eby, but the trial court never did so. Eby's rule 60(b) motion clearly sought relief 
from a premature judgment that was improperly entered by the trial court before it ruled 
on the legal issue of the credit, and therefore before properly crediting Eby with the 
excessive portion of the Geary settlement to Lange. 
The fact that Eby raised the issue of the credit in his rule 60(b) motion is not 
disputable. Eby expressly argued that he was entitled to relief "in light of [Lange's] 
settlement with Geary." Eby's Memorandum In Support Of Motion for Relief From 
Judgment at 3 (R. 1193-1209). "[Lange] already has received in settlement from a co-
obligor many times her total damages." Id. at 4. Eby incorporated in his rule 60(b) 
motion his prior Objections To Plaintiffs' Proposed Judgment which objections were filed 
before he knew the judgment had been entered. Id. at 1. Therein, Eby "contended] no 
judgment should be entered unti l . . . the issue of the credit to which Eby is entitled, is 
ruled upon in the [trial c]ourt." Objections To Plaintiffs Proposed Judgment at 1 (R. 
1170-75). One of the objections was the fact that the trial court had not yet ruled on the 
issue of the credit and had not yet applied the credit in favor of Eby. Id. at 4. Again, the 
objection and motion at issue were in the context of the trial court having said it would 
entertain briefing and then rule on the issue of the credit following a verdict against Eby, 
but having failed to do so. R. 1048-49. The issue of crediting Eby with the excessive 
settlement Lange received from Geary was a basis for Eby's rule 60(b) motion which 
motion was denied because the trial court ultimately refused to credit Eby with any part of 
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the Geary settlement. 
Lange also points out that this same basis, the credit to which Eby is entitled by 
law, was asserted as a basis for Eby's other (first) motion that is not the subject of this 
appeal. Lange suggests that because the issue of the credit was the basis for that motion, 
it somehow cannot also be a basis for the instant rule 60(b) motion that is the subject of 
this appeal. No reason has been given, nor could any reason be given, to support such an 
absurd position that the issue of the credit not yet being fully considered and ruled upon 
can only be a basis for one motion and not the other or both at the same time. It should 
not be forgotten that the first motion that addressed the issue of the credit was filed when 
it was believed no judgment had been entered. The rule 60(b) motion that also addressed 
the issue of the credit was filed after Eby learned the judgment had been entered. The 
instant motion merely sought a different remedy in light of the changed circumstances, 
yet the basis for the relief was the same - the trial court's continuing failure to consider 
and grant a credit to Eby for the excessive Geary settlement paid to Lange. The mere 
existence of the first motion not now before this Court is no reason not to consider the 
trial court's ultimate refusal thereafter to grant the requested credit and the related relief 
sought through the instant rule 60(b) motion.2 
Finally, Lange incorrectly contends that Eby cannot argue on appeal the particular 
2The first motion is not before the Court only because the Court refused 
jurisdiction over the denial of that motion due to the technicality of the Notice of Appeal 
being filed after the announcement of the decision but before the actual order. It is worth 
noting that that senseless technicality now has been removed from revised Rule 4 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, effective November 1, 2005. 
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errors that led to the erroneous denial of his rule 60(b) motion, the refusal to consider the 
credit and ultimate wrongful rejection of the credit, because they constitute legal errors. 
There is no such limitation to the Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) grounds for relief from a 
judgment. Lange relies on Fischer v. Bybee, 2004 UT 92, 104 P.3d 1198 and Franklin 
Covev Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin. 2000 UT App 110, 2 P.3d 451. These cases do not 
limit Eby's right to relief from the judgment that was entered before the trial court 
considered and granted to him the credit required by law. 
The case at bar presents the usual circumstance where the trial court entered 
judgment upon its own mistake, inadvertence or neglect. It expressly stated in a pretrial 
ruling that it would invite further briefing and rule after trial upon the issue of a credit to 
avoid a double recovery by Lange, should a verdict be entered against Eby. R. 1048-49. 
The trial court mistakenly, inadvertently or negligently entered judgment against Eby 
without complying with what it said it would do. Later, after the rule 60(b) motion was 
filed, the trial court ultimately made the additional legal mistake of refusing to grant the 
credit, and for that reason denied the rule 60(b) motion. 
Fischer, citing Franklin Covey, holds that judicial mistake includes the correction 
of a judicial oversight which usually would be obvious. The failure of a trial court to do 
what it previously ruled it would do certainly is an oversight that usually would be 
obvious. The wrongful refusal to grant a credit expressly required by law also should be 
obvious. At a minimum, Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) applies to set aside the premature 
judgment that should not have been entered until after the trial court fully considered and 
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ruled on the issue of the credit which occurred on December 20, 2004.3 The December 
27, 2004 Notice Of Appeal (R. 1287-88) certainly would be timely to appeal the legal 
mistake of not granting the credit as reflected in a judgment filed at any time on or after 
December 20, 2004. Utah R. App. P. 4(a) (notice of appeal required within 30 days after 
the entry of judgment). See also Utah R. App. P. 4(c) ("a notice of appeal filed after the 
announcement of a . . . judgment... but before the entry of the judgment... shall be 
treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof9). 
Moreover, Fischer and Franklin Covey do not address the other grounds set forth 
in Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) for relief from judgment. In addition to judicial mistake, Lange 
concedes that Eby also relies on the grounds that the judgment has been satisfied, 
discharged, or is void and the trial court, and now this Court, should grant relief from the 
judgment because it is no longer equitable that it should have prospective application 
(subsection 5) and for the miscellaneous grounds of fairness and equity (subsection 6). 
(Lange Br. at 8.) With the credit required by law, the judgment is satisfied, discharged 
and/or void. With the credit required by law, it is inequitable to allow the judgment to 
have continued application against Eby. With the credit required by law, this Court is 
justified in granting Eby relief from the current judgment. The trial court should have 
granted Eby relief from the judgment for any or all of those reasons. Its failure to do so is 
an abuse of discretion. Indeed, its failure is an error that must be corrected as a matter of 
law inasmuch as it is predicated on the erroneous legal conclusion that Eby was not 
3Eby mistakenly indicated in its opening brief that it was December 12, 2004. The 
correct date of the hearing and oral ruling was December 20, 2004. R. 1278-82. 
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entitled to a credit. 
Eby properly has raised on appeal the erroneous nature of the basis for the trial 
court's denying him relief from the premature and improper judgment. 
II. SECTION 15-4-3 OF THE JOINT OBLIGATIONS ACT REQUIRES 
THAT EBY BE CREDITED WITH GEARY'S EXCESSIVE 
SETTLEMENT TO LANGE. 
Turning to the substance of the reason why Eby's rule 60(b) motion was denied, 
Lange argues, as anticipated, that the Liability Reform Act ("LRA") in general repeals by 
implication the particular statute at issue, section 15-4-3 of the Joint Obligations Act 
("JOA"). Therefore, Lange contends, section 15-4-3 of the JOA cannot be applied in this 
case. Lange is wrong because she ignores Utah law pertaining to repeals by implication 
and misinterprets the differing purposes of the LRA and JOA. 
Lange does not dispute, in fact she does not address, Utah law that requires 
statutes to be reconciled to the fullest possible extent. Repeal by implication is not 
favored. Two statutes that address different issues easily are reconcilable to give full 
effect to how the different issues are addressed. Only when two statutes address the same 
issue differently is there a likelihood of a conflict that cannot be reconciled. The LRA 
and JOA address different issues that can, and must, be reconciled by this Court. The 
JOA is not implicitly repealed simply because Lange does not like its continuing effect in 
the LRA era. It is absolutely false to say, as does Lange, that to "reduce a defendant's 
liability by amounts paid by other defendants to settle their percentage share of fault 
would be totally inconsistent with the purpose of the LRA." (Lange Br. at 9.) 
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The LRA addresses the issue of the allocation of fault among multiple defendants. 
It abolishes joint and several liability in favor of only several liability of each defendant 
only to the extent of such defendant's proportionate share of fault. Section 15-4-3 does 
not purport to allocate fault among multiple defendants. Section 15-4-3 addresses the 
completely different issue of limiting plaintiffs to one recovery for a single harm caused 
by multiple defendants. It provides for only one recovery by a plaintiff who receives 
consideration from one or more of several defendants on their obligations by crediting the 
amount received on the obligations of all co-defendants. It expressly pertains to 
consideration received from "one or more of several obligors," as well as "one or more of 
joint or [even] joint and several obligors." The LRA does not address the one-recovery 
rule that pertains to plaintiffs. It nowhere states that the payment by one co-obligor 
severally liable to the plaintiff is not to be credited to the extent of the amount received on 
the obligations of all co-obligors. The two statutes are compatible, reconcilable and 
applicable in limiting Lange's ability to recover the huge economic windfall she seeks in 
this case. 
This conclusion is compelled by, among other cases, Murray City v. Hall 663 P.2d 
1314 (Utah 1983). Utah law unambiguously provides that two statutes are to be 
construed to maintain the integrity of both because repeal of a statute by implication is not 
favored. Although Lange has not disputed such authority, she has criticized Eby's 
citation to the Murray City case which states this hornbook law. Eby cited that case only 
for the general statement of Utah law that prohibits repeal by implication except in the 
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limited circumstance of a former statute being irreconcilable with a later statute. 
Apparently accepting the law as stated by the Murray City court, Lange nevertheless 
suggests that the facts of that case undermine Eby's position. They clearly do not. 
In Murray City, a former statute addressed the specific issue of when it is unlawful 
for an intoxicated person to drive a vehicle, stating that there were a series of rebuttable 
presumptions. One of the rebuttable presumptions was that a person was intoxicated if 
found to have .08 percent or more by weight alcohol in his/her blood. A later statute 
provide that a blood alcohol content of 1.0 percentage or greater created a non-rebuttable 
conclusion of intoxication. Both statutes addressed the exact same issue of when it is 
unlawful to drive while intoxicated. Even with the two statutes addressing the same 
issue, there was not a total repeal by implication. Instead, the Utah Supreme Court 
reconciled the two statute to the extent possible. It held that a blood alcohol content of 
.08 percent or greater but less than 1.0 percent gave rise to only a rebuttable presumption 
while a blood alcohol content of 1.0 percent or greater gave rise to a non-rebuttal 
conclusion of intoxication. 663 P.2d at 1318-19. This Court also must reconcile section 
15-4-3 with the LRA, to the fullest extent possible. 
Neither does Jorgensen v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.. 769 P.2d 809 (Utah 1988) 
aid Lange, who merely quotes a few lines of text out of context and without analysis. In 
dicta, the court stated that the drafters of section 15-4-3 had in mind obligations that were 
"shared by the obligors." The facts of that case are convoluted but necessary to fully 
appreciate the statement quoted by Lange. 
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In Jorgensen, Aetna was a surety for a livestock dealer who sold some sheep to the 
plaintiff. Both the dealer and Aetna were sued by the purchaser for the dealer's breach of 
contract, and the purchaser obtained a judgment for $191,463.40 of which Aetna was 
jointly and severally liable for the amount of its bond - $75,000. Aetna shared no liability 
for the remainder of the judgment. 769 P.2d at 810. Both defendants appealed, but only 
the dealer obtained a supercedeas bond for the full amount of the judgment against him. 
The bond was provided by Aetna who did not file a separate bond to cover the $75,000 
portion of the judgment for which it shared liability. Thereafter, the amount of the 
judgment was augmented with an award for prejudgment interest and post judgment 
interest. Id. After the appeal resulted in upholding the initial damages award and later 
interest awards, the plaintiff moved for judgment against Aetna as surety on the 
supercedeas bond for the full amount of the judgment against the dealer who by then had 
filed a bankruptcy petition. That motion was resolved by stipulation with Aetna's 
payment of only $191,463.40, the exact amount of the initial damage award without any 
interest. Aetna made that payment solely as surety on the supercedeas bond and not as a 
co-obligor of any shared liability. The plaintiff then claimed that Aetna still was liable 
for $75,000 of the original judgment plus interest. Aetna took the position it only was 
liable on the judgment against it for the post-judgment interest on the $75,000 for which it 
shared liability with the dealer, and Aetna paid only that interest. Id. at 810-11. 
On appeal again, the pertinent issues were (1) how to properly allocate a partial 
payment on a debt when the payor, the dealer (since Aetna made that payment only as 
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surety on the supercedeas bond, that payment is deemed to have been made by the dealer), 
has two obligations - one a separate debt for the entire amount and the other a joint and 
several debt for a portion of that amount; and (2) when a partial payment is made on an 
interest bearing debt, should the payment first be credited to principal or interest? Id. at 
811. The Utah Supreme Court held that as a general rule in the absence of any agreement 
or election by the debtor or creditor, it is presumed that a payment is credited first to the 
separate debt of the payor with any remainder allocated to the joint debt of the payor. It 
also held that interest was to be paid before principal. In this context, the court ruled that 
section 15-4-3 did not over-ride the above-stated general rule by requiring the payment to 
be applied first to the joint debt. In doing so, the court stated that the language "their 
obligations" of that section suggested that the section applied to obligations that are 
"shared" by obligors and did not "govern the allocation of a payment made by one who 
has two separate obligations, one of which happens to be a shared obligation and the 
second of which is an entirely individual obligation." Id- at 812. Thus, in context, the 
Jorgensen court only held that section 15-4-3 applies to crediting shared obligations, not 
whether a single payment is to be applied first to a payor's shared debt before the payor's 
separate debt. 
Moreover, it cannot be inferred by Jorgensen that section 15-4-3 only applies to 
joint and several obligations, or that only joint and several obligations are "shared" 
obligations. It should be not be forgotten that the separate debt or obligation was the 
obligation of the dealer for the entire judgment plus interest, and that Aetna's payment of 
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that judgment without interest was as surety on the supercedes bond; hence, it was as if 
the dealer himself made that payment. Therefore, that payment was applied first to the 
dealer's separate debt, interest before principal, and then to the dealer's joint debt with 
Aetna "with the resulting reduction of that joint debt being credited equally between the 
co-obligors, as section 15-4-3 of the Code requires." Id. at 814. Even with that credit, 
the shared obligation was not satisfied and Aetna's second payment went toward paying 
off that shared debt, interest before principle, leaving an amount still owed by Aetna. 
Had there been an issue of whether the dealer would have been credited with that second 
payment, there is no doubt section 15-4-3 would have applied for his benelit as well. 
Their shared obligation pertaining to the judgment against them simply happened to be 
"joint and several" rather than several only. The rule set down in Jorgensen does not 
undermine the applicability of section 15-4-3 to the case at bar. 
Just like the dealer and Aetna in the Jorgensen case, Eby and Geary certainly did 
have a shared obligation to Lange within the scope of section 15-4-3. That section 
expressly pertains to "several obligors," "joint... obligors" and "joint and several 
obligors." Eby and Geary both were subject to liability to Lange who is an "obligee" - "a 
person having a right based on tort" - entitled to payment for the same tort damages 
arising from the same harm to her real property. Section 15-4-1(2). The fact that their 
obligations happened to be several, and limited, because of the LRA does not mean their 
obligations were not "shared" within the scope of the JOA. 
Leaving her attempt to rely on Utah authority, Lange next makes a policy 
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argument. She contends that because of the LRA plaintiffs now settle at their own risk 
because they may settle with a severally liable co-defendant for less than the amount for 
which a jury may determine that particular defendant to be responsible. In order to reduce 
that risk, Lange complains, plaintiffs should be entitled to prevent any overpayment in 
settlement from being credited to any co-defendants. Lange 5s reasoning is wrong because 
plaintiffs always had a risk in settling. A plaintiff may have settled with a joint and 
severally liable co-defendant only to find that the amount is less than the verdict and what 
any other jointly liable co-defendant can pay. The risk now may be different, but there 
always has been a risk. 
Likewise, it makes no difference that co-defendants who were jointly and severally 
liable had rights to contribution, but severally liable co-defendants do not because their 
liability is limited to their proportionate share of fault. Contribution and the one-recovery 
rule are not conflicting concepts. The right to a credit for excessive payments made to a 
plaintiff is not related to the right to contribution from a co-defendant who made no 
payment. If too little was paid in settlement by one severally liable obligor, the LRA 
prevents the obligee from seeking recovery of the difference from any other co-obligor. 
That is a policy decision encompassed in the LRA. However, if too much was paid, the 
LRA is silent. Section 15-4-3 then kicks in and requires any overpayment to be credited 
in whole or partial satisfaction of the other obligors' obligations to the extent of the 
overpayment received on the obligations of all such co-obligors. If any overage still 
exists after such credit is given, the receiving obligee is entitled to retain the full benefit 
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of that bargain. Nothing has to be paid back to the settling payor. Nothing has to be paid 
by the obligee to anyone else. The obligee simply is fortunate enough to have reached a 
bargain that more than compensates her for the damages suffered. There is nothing unfair 
to plaintiffs about the one-recovery rule that is codified in section 15-4-3. 
The LRA's intent to limit liability of co-defendants to their proportionate share of 
fault does not express an intent not to limit liability further by crediting to all co-
defendants an excessive payment made by one of the defendants. The LRA does not 
express an intent to abolish the one-recovery rule codified in section 15-4-3. The LRA 
does nothing to implicitly repeal section 15-4-3. The issue raised by Lange really boils 
down to the policy decision, to be made by the Utah Legislature, of whether the crediting 
requirement of section 15-4-3 should remain the policy of Utah, or whether Utah should 
move towards favoring plaintiffs by allowing them to recover more than once for their 
damages by repealing the existing legal right to a credit afforded co-defendants who are 
sued for the same tort and resulting damages. 
To support her position on how she believes Utah policy should be changed, Lange 
turns to foreign authority. That authority is not binding on this Court. Indeed, such 
authority is advanced only as an invitation to judicially legislate away section 15-4-3, not 
to show how the LRA implicitly repeals section 15-4-3. E.g., Glenn v. Fleming, 732 P.2d 
750 (Kan. 1987) (no statute similar to section 15-4-3 was considered; holding only that 
where the fault of the settling defendant was not submitted to the jury, the judgment 
should not be reduced by the amount the plaintiff received from the settling party); 
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Gemstar Ltd. v. Ernst & Young, 917 P.2d 222 (Ariz. 1996) (no statute like section 15-4-3 
was considered; settlement and judgment together were less than the plaintiffs total 
damages); Krieser v. Hobbs, 166 F.3d 736 (5th Cir. 1999) (no statute similar to section 15-
4-3 was considered, instead the Mississippi crediting statute did not apply because it 
pertained only to "joint or joint and several" liability, not several liability); Nilsson v. 
Bierman, 839 A.2d 25 (N.H. 2003) (no statute similar to section 15-4-3 was considered, 
instead the New Hampshire crediting statute did not apply because it pertained only to 
"joint and several" liability, not several liability). Anticipating Lange's reliance on 
foreign authority to support a change in Utah policy, Eby discussed Gemstar in its initial 
brief. (Eby Br. at 22-25.) That discussion, not opposed by Lange, disposes of all Lange's 
foreign authority.4 Lange's policy arguments are wrong. However, more importantly, 
those arguments demonstrate that they are for full consideration by the Utah Legislature, 
4The case of Krieser v. Hobbs. now cited by Lange, also expressly undermines 
Lange's position. That court acknowledged that where there was a state statute like 
section 15-4-3, its conclusion would have to be different until the state legislature 
changed that statute. It stated: 
The case from Idaho, Curtis [v. Canyon Highway Dist. No. 4, 
122 Idaho 73, 831 P.2d 541 (Idaho 1992)], held that 
legislative modification of joint-and-several liability did not 
implicitly repeal its tortfeasor release statute. However, 
Curtis confronted a specific statute mandating a pro tanto 
credit, as well as a rule limiting implied repeal unless two 
statutes are "manifestly inconsistent with and repugnant to 
each other," 831 P.2d at 546. 
166 F.3d at 744. It is the Utah Legislature, not Lange through this Court, who must 
abolish the one-recovery rule as applied in the context of severally liable defendants, if it 
is to be abolished as she hopes. 
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not this Court. This Court is required to reconcile section 15-4-3 with the LRA and not 
judicially legislate section 15-4-3 into nonexistence. 
Lange also contends that Nelson v. Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints, 935 P.2d 512 (Utah 1997), a case that exemplifies the 
importance of reconciling the JO A with the LRA, is inapposite because it involved a 
different issue, section 15-4-4 instead of section 15-4-3. Section 15-4-4 pertains to 
releasing one co-defendant while preserving the right to proceed against other co-
defendants. Lange misses Eby's point. As to section 15-4-4, the point is that it was not 
implicitly repealed in total, but was reconciled to the extent possible such that section 15-
4-4 continued to be applicable to vicariously liable defendants. Section 15-4-4 was held 
to apply, and not be implicitly repealed, despite the fact that the LRA also directly 
addressed this same issue in section 78-27-42. The court held that section 15-4-4 applied 
to vicariously liable co-defendants and section 78-27-42 applied to "regular" co-
defendants. 935P.2dat514n.3. See also Peterson v. Coca-Cola USA, 2002 UT 42, f 
22,48P.3d941,947. 
Also, Lange totally ignores that Nelson held, in the LRA era, that section 15-4-3 
would apply, and the Court did so without any statement that it applied because of the 
particular relationship between the co-defendants. 835 P.2d at 514-15. There is no 
implication in Nelson that section 15-4-3, that addresses a different issue, does not apply 
to plaintiffs' settlements with "regular" LRA co-defendants. The Nelson court simply 
stated that under the JOA "any amount received [from] one obligor is to be credited 
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against any amount owed by the rest." Id. at 514. 
Lange contends again, yet from a different angle, that Eby and Geary did not share 
a tort obligation to Lange because their "liability" was separate. In other words, Lange 
argues that section 15-4-3 only would apply if Eby was liable for Geary's conduct and 
Geary was liable for Eby's conduct. That is not what section 15-4-3 provides. It nowhere 
requires vicarious or even joint liability between co-obligors. Their obligations to Lange 
were to compensate her for the same harm. Liability for that harm was shared by both 
Eby and Geary. Both were found to be at fault for that harm. They were co-obligors 
within the meaning and scope of section 15-4-3, regardless of whether they otherwise 
were severally, jointly or jointly and severally liable, as expressly contemplated by that 
section. 
Finally, Lange argues in favor of a tortured application of section 15-4-3 in an 
attempt to demonstrate that it cannot be applied in this case. Lange suggests that Eby 
should be entitled to a credit before Geary's proportionate share of fault is paid. In other 
words, Lange contends that section 15-4-3 requires a credit of any payment, even if there 
is no overpayment by the paying obligor. Obviously, a defendant who pays only its 
proportionate share of fault which no other defendant is liable to pay has not made an 
excessive payment to be credited to the benefit of the other defendants. It is not Eby's 
intent to have section 15-4-3 applied as if the LRA did not exist. Eby's intent is to have 
section 15-4-3 reconciled with the LRA to the fullest extent possible, just like the two 
statutes in Murray City were reconciled. In that case, the first statute did not expressly 
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state that the rebuttable presumption of intoxication extended only up to a blood alcohol 
content of 1.0 percent, hut the court read that limitation into the statute in light of the later 
statute. Reading limitations into a former statute in order to reconcile it with a later 
statute also was done in Nelson, supra. This Court has to reconcile section 15-4-3 with 
the LRA in the same sort of way that makes sense. Eby has shown how that is to be done. 
Lange does not suggest that Eby's approach does not make sense. It is not helpful for her 
to attack an approach not advanced by Eby. Section 15-4-3 can, and should, be applied in 
this case in a reasonable and reconciliatory way within the context of the LRA, as shown 
by Eby. 
There is no question but that Lange wants to prevent any credit to Eby in order to 
be able to recover even more from Eby in addition to the settlement proceeds that already 
far exceed her damages. What is this desired result, if not an economic windfall that is 
over 300% of her damages? Eby certainly received no economic windfall. He has not 
received a thing. He is entitled, in accordance with existing law, merely to a limitation of 
his liability to his proportionate share of fault and to his share of damages caused by his 
fault for which Lange has not already been compensated by a co-obligor. If Geary had 
only overcompensated Lange by a small difference, Eby would only be entitled to a credit 
for that difference and would be liable for the remainder. It just so happens that Geary 
overcompensated Lange by many times her damages. Even with the credit required by 
law, Lange will be able to retain an economic windfall far in excess of her actual damages 
that were determined by the jury. 
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CONCLUSION 
Eby respectfully requests that the Order Denying Eby's Motion For Relief From 
Judgment be reversed. Eby is entitled to relief from the judgment in light of the credit to 
which he is entitled by law and which the trial said it would, but did not, consider before 
entering judgment. It is against the law, unjust and inequitable for any judgment to 
remain against Eby when he is entitled to be credited with the excessive portion of 
Geary's settlement. Thus, it is requested that the judgment be vacated and that Eby 
recover his costs on appeal. 
DATED this 7th day of October, 2005. 
BERMAN & SAVAGE, P.C. 
E. Scott Savage 
Casey K. McGarvey 
Attorney^ for David Eby 
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